We study banking using the tools of mechanism design, without a priori assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. Given preferences, technologies, and certain frictions -including limited commitment and imperfect monitoring -we describe the set of incentive feasible allocations and interpret the outcomes in terms of institutions that resemble banks. Our bankers endogenously accept deposits, and their liabilities help others in making payments. This activity is essential: if it were ruled out the set of feasible allocations would be inferior. We discuss how many and which agents play the role of bankers. For example, we show agents who are more connected to the market are better suited for this role since they have more to lose by reneging on obligations. We discuss some banking history and compare it with the predictions of our theory.
Introduction
Our goal is to study banking without making a priori assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. To this end we adopt the approach of mechanism design. This method, in general, begins by describing an economic environment, by which we mean preferences, technologies, and certain frictions -including spatial or temporal separation, information problems, commitment issues, etc. One then tries to describe the set of allocations that are attainable, respecting both resource and incentive feasibility constraints. Sometimes one also describes allocations that are optimal according to particular criteria. One then looks at these allocations and tries to interpret the outcomes in terms of institutions that we observe in actual economies.
We want to see if something that looks like banking emerges as an outcome of this exercise. To reiterate, we do not take a bank as a primitive concept. Our primitives are preferences, technologies, and frictions, and we want to see if something like banking arises endogenously.
Much has been written about the virtues of mechanism design in general.
1 Our particular approach is close to that advocated by Townsend (1987 Townsend ( , 1990 . He describes the method as asking if institutions that we see in the world, such as observed credit or insurance arrangements, can be derived from simple but internally consistent economic models, where by internal consistency we mean that one cannot simply assume a priori that some markets are missing, contracts are incomplete, prices are sticky, etc. Of course, something that looks like missing markets or incomplete contracts may emerge, but the idea is to lay out the environment explicitly and derive this as an outcome. 2 Simple models, with minimal frictions, may not generate arrangements 1 Seminal contributors to mechanism design have recently been honored with a Nobel prize; go to http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/ecoadv07.pdf for a general description of the approach.
2 As Townsend (1988) puts it: "The competitive markets hypothesis has been viewed primarily as a postulate to help make the mapping from environments to outcomes more precise ... In the end though it should be emphasised that market structure should be endogenous to the class of general equilibrium models at hand. That is, the theory should explain why markets sometimes exist and that resemble those in actual economies -they typically predict e.g. that credit and insurance work better than the institutions we observe. So, one asks, what additional complications can be introduced to bring the theory more in line with what we see?
We want to apply this method to study banking.
Obviously some frictions are needed, since models like Arrow-Debreu have no role for banks. As has been discussed often, frictionless models have no role for any institution whose role is to facilitate the process of exchange. The simplest example is the institution of money, and a classic challenge in monetary economics is to ask what frictions make money essential, in the following sense: money is said to be essential when the set of allocations that satisfy incentive and other feasibility conditions is bigger or better with money than without it (Wallace 2001 (Wallace , 2008 . We study the essentiality of banks, in the same sense. Just like monetary economists ought not take the role of money as given, for this issue, we cannot take banks as primitive. In our environment, it is a good idea for the planner -or mechanism -to have some agents perform certain functions that resemble salient elements of banking: they take deposits, and their liabilities (claims on deposits) are used by others to facilitate the exchange process. This activity is essential: if it were ruled out the set of feasible allocations would be inferior.
The vast literature on banks is surveyed by Gorton and Winton (2002) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) . Much of this research is based on informational frictions, including adverse selection, moral hazard, and costly state veri…cation, that hinder the channeling of funds from investors to entrepreneurs. One can distinguish broadly three main strands. One approach originating with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) interprets banks as coalitions of agents providing insurance against liquidity shocks.
Another approach pioneered by Leland and Pyle (1977) and developed by Boyd and Prescott (1986) interprets bank as coalitions sharing information in ways that induce sometimes do not, so that economic organisation falls out in the solution to the mechanism design problem." agents to truthfully reveal the quality of investments. A third approach following Diamond (1984) interprets banks as delegated monitors taking advantage of returns to scale. All of these papers provide useful insights, although they often take as given institutional details that we want to endogenize here, especially when we study how many agents should become bankers, which ones, and why, as well as their role in the payment process. 3 Compared to previous work we focus more on commitment issues, and less on informational frictions, although imperfect monitoring is also an important element of the model. We highlight limited commitment because banking concerns intertemporal reallocation, and we want to take seriously incentives to make good on credit obligations. Our agents can use stored output as collateral to ameliorate commitment problems, but this does not work perfectly if collateral can be easily liquidated. 4 An implication is that delegated storage may be useful: if you deposit your output with a third party, who has less incentive or ability to liquidate it for strategic reasons, others are more willing to give you credit. Thus, claims on deposits can be used to facilitate transactions, and this resembles banking. This activity can be part of an e¢ cient arrangement even if the third party has an inferior storage technology. Thus, bank liabilities can be useful for payments even if dominated in return, although other things being equal it is obviously better if the bank has access to a good storage or other investment opportunities.
3 Work on the Diamond-Dybvig model is a large branch of the banking literature; see e.g. Jacklin (1987) , Wallace (1988 Wallace ( , 1990 , Peck and Shell (2003) , Green and Lin (2003) , Andolfatto et al. (2007) , and Ennis and Keister (2008) . Usually, if not always, Diamond-Dybvig models do not interpret the bank as a self-interested agent, but as a contract or a mechanism, nor do they derive which agents should be bankers. In the papers that emphasize information sharing or delegated monitoring, banks are agents, but their role is restricted to solving information problems, and again they typically do not derive endogenously which agents will be bankers. The fact that bank liabilities play a role in the payment system is usually not considered at all, but see Andolfatto and Nosal (2008) , Huangfu and Sun (2008) , Kyiotaki and Moore (2006) , Williamson and Sanches (2008 ), He et. al. (2005 , Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , Wallace (2005) , and Mills (2008) . 4 If e.g. a debtor can consume the goods, his promise to deliver them out of storage may not be any more credible than a pledge to deliver goods out of future production. This is related to the discussion in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) about why it is hard to borrow against capital. See also Mills and Reed (2008) and the references therein.
The general idea is obviously correct that sellers often accept in payment the obligation of a third party -which can take the form of a note, check, credit/debit card, or other instrument issued by a commercial bank -when they would not accept your personal IOU. We want to ask, however, why the third party is less inclined than you to renege on obligations. In our approach, future rewards and punishments mitigate strategic behavior, but monitoring is imperfect (opportunistic deviations are only detected probabilistically). Agents with a higher likelihood of being monitored have a greater incentive to make good on obligations, and hence are better suited to take on the responsibility of holding deposits. This is not a new insight -better monitoring is the key characteristic underlying banks in e.g. the Cavalcanti-Wallace (1999a , 1999b model -but it is nonetheless a valid insight. However, it seems to pin a lot on an assumption that some agents are exogenously easier to monitor.
Hence, we also assume that agents have di¤erent probabilities of gaining from market activity, or have di¤erent stakes in the economic system. Even with equal monitoring probabilities, those with a higher stake in the system are less inclined to deviate from proscribed behavior, because they have more to potentially lose from getting caught and punished (here punishment entails future autarky). Consistent with the history of banking, as we discuss in detail below, individuals with a greater connection to the market are better suited to be bankers, since they have more to lose by reneging on obligations, even if they can be monitored as well as others. When we collect these results, we …nd that bankers should be agents with a combination of the following characteristics: they have access to good storage technologies or other investment opportunities; they can be more easily monitored; and they have more to gain from the market and hence more to potentially lose from strategic behavior.
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Even if these results are not too surprising, the analysis identi…es precisely the relevant e¤ects and the nature of the tradeo¤s when, for instance, we show how it 5 The theory also predicts that agents who are more patient are better suited for the role of banker, although we emphasize this less. may be desirable to sacri…ce rate of return by depositing wealth with parties that are more easily monitored or have a bigger stake in the economic system. Similarly, when we choose which agents should be monitored, and hence could be good bankers, we can show precisely how it is e¢ cient to choose those with the right combination of a bigger stake in the system and better investment opportunities. Similarly, when we discuss the e¢ cient number of banks, we can lay out the tradeo¤ between having fewer bankers, which reduces monitoring costs, and having more deposits per bank, which increases incentives to misbehave. All of this comes directly out of a mechanism design approach, without primitive assumptions about what is a bank, who is a bank, or what banks do. And, as we discuss, these implications are useful for analyzing the history of banking. Hence, we think the approach provides some new and interesting insights.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic economic environment, emphasizing the roles of temporal separation, limited commitment, and imperfect monitoring. Section 3 characterizes incentive feasible and optimal allocations in a baseline version of the model with one sector, by which we mean one group of ex ante homogeneous agents. Section 4 considers an economy with more than one sector, by which we mean di¤erent groups of ex ante heterogeneous agents (in general, they may have di¤erent attachments to the market, monitoring e¢ ciencies, and storage technologies). This section contains the main result on the essentiality of activities that resemble banking: we show that is can be desirable to have agents make deposits with others (delegated storage), and claims on these deposits facilitate exchange. Section 5 provides results on who should be a banker, how to monitor them when it is costly, and why deposits can be useful for payments even if they are dominated in rate of return. Section 6 concludes. Although the framework is quite tractable, there are some technical details involved in several of the proofs that we relegate to the Appendix.
The environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are N 1 di¤erent sectors, where by a sector we mean a group of ex ante homogeneous agents, while in general agents are heterogeneous across sectors. The role of sectors will be clear later. A representative sector has a set A of agents that each period are partitioned into three groups, A 0 , A 1 and A 2 , with measures 0 ; 1 and 2 . For now A is arbitrary (e.g. it could be …nite or in…nite). Agents take it as given that each period they belong to A i with probability i . Agents in A 1 and A 2 are called traders of type 1 and 2: they potentially produce, consume, and derive payo¤s as described below. Agents in A 0 are called nontraders: that period they neither consume nor produce, and derive a payo¤ normalized to 0.
Among other things, this setup captures the idea that agents can have di¤erent stakes in the economy: a bigger 0 means that you have less to gain from participating in the market, which will play a critical role in dynamic incentive conditions below.
In each period there are two goods, 1 and 2. Agents in A 1 consume good 1 and produce good 2, while agents in A 2 consume good 2 and produce good 1. Letting x i and y i denote consumption and production by type i, assume utility U i (x i ; y i ) is increasing in x i , decreasing in y i , and satis…es the usual convexity conditions. Also,
A key friction is temporal separation: we divide each period in two and assume good i must be consumed in subperiod i. This implies a role for credit, since type 1 consumes before type 2. To have a notion of collateral, assume good 2 is produced in the …rst subperiod although it is consumed in the second, and hence must be stored across subperiods. Another key friction is that type 2 agents cannot store good 2 for themselves, as this would eliminate temporal separation and any interesting discussion of credit. Thus, only a producer of good 2 can store it. A unit of good 2 stored in the …rst subperiod returns 1 + units in the second; we set = 0
for now and consider 6 = 0 below. Although goods can be stored across subperiods, they fully depreciate across periods.
Collateral here works as follows: we can potentially get type 1 agents to produce good 2 by o¤ering them good 1 in the …rst subperiod, and then ask them to deliver good 2 in the second subperiod, after the production cost has been sunk. In a real sense they are getting a loan to consume good 1, with a promise to deliver good 2 later, backed by storage. To make this imperfect, however, we let type 1 get liquidation utility x 2 if they consume x 2 out of storage, and if > 0 there is an opportunity cost to delivering the goods, even if the production cost is sunk. 6 We allow a given type 1 agent to derive liquidation utility from any good 2, even if it was produced by another agent, including one from a di¤erent sector. However, only goods produced within a sector enter U i (x i ; y i ), which means that any transfers across sectors here will be due to incentive considerations, and not the usual gains for trade. Also, we assume that U 1 (x 1 ; y 1 ) + y 1 U 1 (x 1 ; 0) for any x 1 , so that it is never e¢ cient for type 1 to produce good 2 for their own (liquidation) consumption.
We focus on symmetric and stationary allocations, given by vectors (x 2 ) for each sector i, plus, as we discuss later, descriptions of cross-sector transfers, storage and liquidation. The planner, or mechanism, collects all production and allocates it to consumers. Hence agents deal directly with the planner, but this is relevant only to the extent that we do not restrict them to bilateral trade: the frictions here do not concern search for the a trading partner, but whether a given trader can be trusted to honor a deal. Note that the planner does not store good 2: it is stored by its producer in subperiod 1, then delivered to the planner in subperiod 2, who can pass it on to a consumer (our planner's job is only to organize trade, not to engage any any form of storage or other production). Assuming for now no transfers across sectors or liquidation, an allocation is resource feasible if 2 y 2 = 1 x 1 and 1 y 1 = 2 x 2 , and hence can be summarized by x = (x 1; x 2 ). To reduce notation, without a¤ecting the interesting results, we set 1 = 2 = and 0 = 1 2 . 6 The assumption of linear liquidation value x 2 is merely to ease the presentation; we could use U 1 (x 1 ; y 1 ; x 2 ), but it adds little other than notation. Let = =(1 ), where is the discount factor across periods, and represents a monitoring technology in the following sense. Our planner, or mechanism, makes recommendations for production, trade and consumption. Agents are free to go along with these recommendations, or to deviate, potentially at the risk of punishment.
Any deviation by an agent from a recommendation is detected, or monitored, with probability . 7 When a deviation is monitored, the agent is punished with autarchy, which means permanent banishment from future market production and consumption (one could consider weaker punishments, but permanent autarchy is obviously the most e¤ective). Notice measures the risk of deviating: the probability of being detected , times one's connection to the market , times the weight one puts on future participation =(1 ). This conveniently makes the critical parameter in the incentive conditions discussed below.
This completes the basic environment, but some special cases are perhaps worth mentioning. First, U i may be additively separable, in which case we can make it quasi-linear without loss in generality by an appropriate choice of units, say
This says that U 1 is linear in one good and U 2 in the other. It would be di¤erent to make them both linear in the same good, say U 1 = x 1 v(x 2 ) and U 2 = u(x 2 ) x 1 , meaning that all the gains from trade accrue from x 2 (thus x 1 is only relevant for incentive reasons, if at all). We can even eliminate x 1 altogether and assume, again without loss in generality, that x 2 enters one function linearly, say
In this case there is nothing one can do to reward type 1 for producing within a period, so incentives involve only future promises, while in general both intertemporal and intratemporal incentives matter. Since it nests 7 Imperfect monitoring has obviously been studied by many people in di¤erent areas of economics, and we cannot survey them all here. In theories of money and banking, Kocherlakota (1998) makes clear the critical function of monitoring (what he calls memory), but only studies the extremes of perfect or no monitoring. Less extreme versions are studied by Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) , who assume actions can be monitored with a lag, and Wallace (1999a, 1999b) , who assume some agents can be monitored while others cannot. Our version is that some deviations can be monitored, probabilistically, while others cannot. all these cases, we study the general speci…cation U i (x i ; x j ), although separable and 
Benchmark allocations
When agents can fully commit, stationary allocations are constrained only by one participation condition
where In particular, we do not use quasi-linear utility for the major simplication in Lagos and Wright (2005) , despite a super…cial resemblance in the applications and in the environments (with the multiple subperiods, a double coincidence problem, etc.). across periods. Suppose now that agents can only commit within a period after types are realized. We then have to ensure that both types want to participate each period,
The left side is the payo¤ to type i who follows the recommendation; the right is the payo¤ to a deviator, who gets detected and punished with probability , and gets away with it with probability 1 . 9 Using = =(1 ), the above inequalities reduce to what we call the dynamic participation, or DP, conditions
Notice (2) implies (1) but not vice versa: with full commitment we can always have U i < 0 as long as S 0, while now we can have U i < 0 only if future rewards are su¢ ciently great, and this depends on . Also, now we may not be able to support the ex ante PO allocation x o . Consider U 1 = x 2 and U 2 = u(x 2 ), so that misses some of what we want. In particular, while we must give agent 1 an incentive to produce for agent 2, once he agrees he cannot renege. That is, once agent 1 agrees to produce good 2 in the second subperiod in exchange for good 1 in the …rst subperiod, he is committed to honor this obligation.
To relax commitment, one could consider what happens when x 2 is actually produced in the second subperiod. Now to get type 1 to produce good 2, after he has already consumed good 1, we need
which reduces to
Now IF allocations satisfy (2) for type 2 and (3) for type 1. This does capture a notion of credit without commitment, and (3) can be interpreted as a repayment constraint, saying we must provide type 1 with the incentive to honor his obligations ex post.
We focus in what follows on a di¤erent model, however, where type 1 produces good 2 in the …rst subperiod and stores it, but may or may not deliver it in the second subperiod, because this is a useful way to think about collateral considerations, and ultimately deposit banking.
The baseline model
If type 1 produces good 2 in the …rst subperiod and stores it to the second subperiod, he can derive liquidation value x 2 by consuming instead of delivering it. Thus, he only delivers the goods if
where the payo¤ to a deviator on the right involves consuming x 1 and producing x 2 in the …rst subperiod, then liquidating in the second, whence with probability he is punished and with probability 1 he is not. This simpli…es to what we call the repayment constraint
If = 0, (4) is implied by (1), so IF allocations are constrained only by (2). Intuitively, = 0 implies the production cost is sunk when it comes time to deliver x 2 , so collateral works very well -in fact it gets us back to full commitment.
If > 0, however, in general the set of IF allocations is given by the DP constraint (2) for both types and the repayment constraint (4) for type 1. Let F 0 denote the set of IF allocations. It is easy to show that F 0 is convex. Also F 0 is trivially non-empty as (0; 0) 2 F 0 . It contains more points, as long as we make some mild assumptions that imply that there are gains from trade. 11 Figure 1 shows F 0 delimited by three curves, de…ned by the three incentives conditions at equality:
Let j 6 = (0; 0) be the point where C r intersects C j . We assume 1 and 2 are unique (a single-crossing condition), as shown in Figure 1 .
In terms of economics, the key point is that the liquidation option implies an opportunity cost of delivering the goods, making collateral imperfect: a promise to deliver x 2 from storage may not be more credible that a promise to produce it. Given , collateralized credit only works if is big, similar to other forms of credit. So 11 Su¢ cient conditions for this are: i) is not too big, and ii) the slope of the curve de…ned by C 1 in the text below has a greater slope than the curve C 2 for type 2 at (0; 0), which follows from standard Inada conditions. credit works better -i.e. we can sustain a bigger and better set of allocations (x 1 ; x 2 ) -when agents are patient ( big), have a sizable connection to the market ( is big), and are more easily monitored ( is big). Given , collateralized credit works better when is smaller.
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We now de…ne the PO set after types are realized as the solution to maximizing per capita welfare
where ! j is the Pareto weight on type j = 0; 1; 2 with
For given ! j , let x solve (5). This contrasts with the ex ante PO allocation x o that maximizes S(x 1 ; x 2 ). The FOCs for (5) are:
Thus, the PO set is given by
Note that if x 2 P then x 2 is an implicit function of x 1 , with
where U i j is the partial of U i with respect to argument j. In what follows, we assume that goods are normal, by which we mean in this context that consumption x 1 is increasing and production x 2 is decreasing in wealth for type 1, while x 2 is increasing and x 1 is decreasing for type 2 agents, in a standard utility maximization problem.
Normal goods implies all terms in parentheses in (9) are positive, and hence implies the curve P slopes downard in (x 1 ; x 2 ) space:
12 When U 1 = u 1 (x 1 ) x 2 , e.g., the repayment condition (4) reduces to x 2 + S(x 1 ; x 2 ) 0 while (2) reduces to u 1 (x 1 ) x 2 + S(x 1 ; x 2 ) 0, and the former is more stringent i¤ type 1's surplus u 1 (x 1 ) x 2 exceeds the opportunity cost of liquidation x 2 . This is particularly transparent when U 1 = x 2 , in which case the repayment condition is more stringent i¤ the marginal opportunity cost of liquidation exceeds the marginal production cost. Lemma 1 P is downward sloping in the sense that dx 2 dx 1 jP < 0. Also P may or may not intersect F 0 depending on and . Similarly, the ex-ante PO allocation x o is in P, but may or may not be in F 0 . For the sake of illustration, the Figure also shows the IF set when we have full commitment F F and the IF set when we have partial commitment F P , with full and partial commitment as de…ned in Section 3.1. Figure 3 shows what happens when we change , or so that increases from a to b . Since this realxes all the incentive conditions, it shifts C 1 up, C 2 down and C r out, expanding F 0 . Notice also that both 1 and 2 shift to the northeast in this example. The following lemma tells us this is a general result when C r cuts C 1 from above (the proof is in the Appendix). Moreover, since decreasing a¤ects only the repayment constraint, it shifts C r out and does not shift C 1 and C 2 . Hence, decreasing also shifts 1 and 2 northeast. in (x 1 ; x 2 ) space.
A multi-sector economy
It will su¢ ce to focus on N = 2. Label the sectors a and b, and assume the following: each period in sector i = a; b, with probability i agents are type 1 i or 2 i traders, producing and consuming goods 1 i and 2 i ; they are nontraders with probability 1 i ;
we can detect deviations with probability i ; and type 1 i agents have liquidation value i . 13 Type 1 i can store and can liquidate either good 2 i produced in sector i or good 2 j produced in sector j 6 = i. There are no gains from trade across sectors for pure mercantile reasons, since goods produced in sector i do not enter U j and vice-versa. We also assume a b which implies that type 1 agents in secto a have a greater ability to liquidate or get greater utility from liquidating.
Direct transfers
With transfers from sector b to sector a, 14 the surpluses in sectors a and b are
14 We typically only consider a transfer t in one direction, from sector b to a, say, since transfers in the other direction are symmetric, and it is never useful to have simultaneous transfers in both directions. Also, note that one can think of t as a tax, but it is not compulsory: we can ask 1 b to voluntarily yield t, but they agree i¤ it satis…es the relevant incentive conditions. Obviously we need S i (x i 1 ; x i 2 ; t) 0, but this is not binding, given the DP conditions: for type 2 i ,
and for type 1 i ,
We also have the repayment constraints
The IF set for the tw-sector model with transfer t satis…es (10)- (13).
We can use t > 0 to relax the constraints in sector a, at the cost of tightening them in sector b. Notice that t a¤ects the repayment constraint (13) only through the future surplus S i (x i 1 ; x i 2 ; t), and a¤ects the DP conditions (11) and (12) Some examples illustrate how this works. First, suppose U 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 x 2 and U 2 (x 2 ; x 1 ) = u (x 2 ) x 1 . Further assume b = 0, to make the example stark. Then
The maximum transfer entailsx
2 ;t = 0, and (14)- (16) hold with equality. Thus, we can get the agents to produce the x 2 that maximizes the surplus, and then tax away the entire surplus witht, and because b = 0 we do not have to worry about repayment. In this extreme case, b is irrelevant, since S b x b 1 ;x b 2 ;t = 0. As another example, let U 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 2 and U 2 (x 2 ; x 1 ) = u (x 2 ), and set b = 1.
Now the IF allocations solve
Clearly (17) and (19) are not binding, given t 0, so we need only worry about (18).
The maximum tax ist The point is that we can use transfers to extract t > 0 from 1 b in sector b and subsidize type 1 a agents, thereby relaxing constraints in sector a. Again, it is no surprise taxes and transfers can increase the IF set; we present these results only to con…rm that deposits can do even more than transfers.
Deposits: delegated storage
Again the planner collects production and redistributes goods for consumption and storage in both sectors, but now in addition to transfers, the planner deposits d 0 
Similarly, type 1
If d > 0 then (22) implies (13) in sector b, while (13) implies (21) 
With delegated storage, the IF set (12) and (21)- (23) (11) and (21) become
15 We can also allow agents in sector b to deposit goods in sector a by d < 0, which makes the resource constraint x To illustrate how d > 0 expands the IF set in more details, suppose U 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = The next example shows we do not need
16 As Selgin (2006) puts is, "Genuine banks are distinguished from other kinds of …nancial intermediaries by the readily transferable or 'spendable'nature of their IOUs, which allows those IOUs to serve as a means of exchange, that is, money... Commercial bank money today consists mainly of deposit balances that can be transferred either by means of paper orders known as checks or electronically using plastic 'debit' cards." We will have more to say about these issues below, but we mention here that many regard the English goldsmiths the original modern bankers, precisely because their receipts circulated in payment (see Section 6 for references). These receipts were the …rst incarnation of banknotes. Soon they also allowed deposits to be transfered by "drawn note"or check. Originally, the depositors were speci…cally interested in safe keeping, which would be a consideration here if we introduced theft; see He at al (2005 He at al ( , 2008 or Sanchez and Williamson (2008) . Relatedly, one could also introduce counterfeiting considerations; see Nosal and Wallace (2007) 
Given t =t, we obtain
wheret andx 
Hence d =t is the biggest deposit type 1 b can accept given they transfert to sector a.
At d =t, the constraints in sector b are tight, but those in sector a are most relaxed.
The IF set in sector a is de…ned by
Since d t , only (32) First, b > a implies more resources can be extracted from sector b to transfer to a. Second, because utility is concave, transfers have di¤erent e¤ects across sectors:
since agents in sector b can sustain better outcomes on their own, they do not gain as much from transfers. The intuition is di¤erent when it comes to deposits. Since 18 Indeed we get
where the last equality follows from the de…nition ofx 2 as the value for which u 0 (x 2 ) = (1 + ) = . 19 To be precise, given x b > a agents in sector b have more to lose if they liquidate storage. Hence we can store more in sector b than a. We will expand on this in the next section.
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5 Extensions and applications
Who should be a banker?
Having shown that deposits are essential, we now ask who should hold them. To address this, suppose that the two sectors have the same preferences, but potentially di¤erent i or i . In terms of i , this can be due to di¤erent i or i . Even with equal monitoring probabilities, e.g. those with a higher i are less inclined to deviate opportunistically: consistent with experience, as discussed below, individuals with a greater connection to the market are better suited to play the role of bankers, because they have more to lose by absconding with the deposits. 20 Note that in this example deposits alone do not expand the IF set. Suppose t = 0. Then (31) and (32) tell us the DP constraint (31) always implies the repayment constraint (32) for any d 0: absent transfers, 1 a agents are not compensated for their production in subperiod 1, except through future payo¤s. Deposits without transfers do not relax this constraint. This is however an artifact of the example, where type 1 do not derive utility from good 1. In the working paper (Mattesini et al. 2009) we provide examples where deposits are essential even when t = 0. Proof: Let i and ' be the Lagrange multipliers on the DP constraint for type i = 1; 2, and the repayment constraint respectively. Suppose the repayment constraint is not binding so that ' = 0. Then the FOCs to the problem above are,
This impliesx 2 P. 
for j = a; b with at least one strict inequality. Notice that a necessary condition for PE in sector i is that the repayment constraint does not bind atx i . Otherwise, strictly positive deposits in sector i will make the repayment constraints tighter, thus shrinking the IF set. 21 Here we do not ask whether t and d together could help, and we only study deposits when we impose t = 0.
22 The term essential means that the set of IF allocation becomes bigger or better. Here we mean better and that is why we use the term Pareto essential. Notice also that if one sector can be made better o¤, then both sectors can be made better o¤ with a small transfer. increasing it in sector a by the green area. This has no e¤ect on welfare in sector b, since x is still feasible, but makes sector a better o¤, since a better allocationx a is now feasible.
As shown, b > a implies we can make sector a better o¤ without hurting sector b by allowing the former to make deposits with the latter. The Proposition says we cannot make sector b better o¤ without hurting sector a when b > a . To conclude, those agents who have more at stake in the market, in the sense of larger , are more suited to become bankers. Of course, there is nothing special about ; what matters is a higher , which in principle can be due to higher , or . It is e¢ cient to get others to produce by o¤ering them consumption, then take their output and store it with a banker, with a higher , since this means he can more credibly commit to honoring claims on these deposits than the original producer.
Who should be monitored?
If there is a cost to monitoring, it should be part of the planner's problem. This is what we analyze next. To simplify the analysis, we distinguish between the probability of monitoring production, which we …x at 2 [0; 1] in both sectors, and the probability of monitoring repayment, which we denote by i in sector i and determine endogenously.
We assume the cost of monitoring with probability~ i is~ i k i . 23 We now de…ne a new benchmark with d = 0 in sector i as the pair (
where W i (x) and F i 0 are as above, except the repayment constraint is now
where
Clearly (34) If agents from sector j deposit goods with sector i, the planner can reduce j . The di¢ culty is that the repayment constraint always binds in both sectors. Therefore, 23 Later we relax this assumption and we assume that the cost of monitoring is c = k 0 +~ k to allow for increasing returns to scale. 24 Also, notice that x is never e¢ cient when monitoring is endogenous: reducing monitoring implies a …rst order gain, while moving away from x entails only a second order loss. 25 With transferable utility and ! 1 = ! 2 = !, when monitoring is paid out of production, we can use transfer t to compensate type 1 b for the increase in monitoring cost and tax type 1 a for his decrease in monitoring cost. So any decrease in total monitoring cost with transfer is Pareto improving. agents 1 i need to me monitored more intensively. This is costly, but it may be desirable if total monitoring costs are lower. Precisely, deposits d in sector i reduce the overall monitoring costs if i increases to i0 and j decreases to j0 so that
In the Appendix we prove the following: With one agent of type 1 in each sector, and b > a , agent 1 b has a bigger stake in the economy. As a consequence his surplus is higher at the benchmark allocations than the one of agent 1 a , i.e. S x
2 ). Therefore, a relatively lower increase in monitoring probability is enough to eliminate opportunistic behavior by
b is large enough then there will no monitoring of repayment in sector a, since all their production can be deposited with sector b.
We now consider an example where the monitoring cost is born explicitly by agent of type 1 in each sector. We show that deposits in sector b can reduce total monitoring cost, while agent 1 a transfers resources to agent 1 b as a compensation for higher monitoring cost in sector b. We set U 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 2 and U 2 (x 2 ; x 1 ) = u (x 2 ).
For simplicity, we assume the monitoring cost is paid up front by agents 1 a and 1 b and once only. For any allocation x i 2 , the DP and repayment constraints with deposits d and transfers t are
, and 
Clearly, with deposits, the change in monitoring cost is 
This is also the maximum transfer t that agent 1 b can expect, and its liquidation value must cover for the extra monitoring cost he su¤ers, or
Therefore, combining (35) and (36), agent 1 b is made better o¤ when taking deposits and receiving a transfer whenever
We summarize this discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Let U 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 2 and U 2 (x 2 ; x 1 ) = u (x 2 ). 
Again, the banker should be agent 1 b if he has more at stake,
, or if he has less ability to default, by which we mean a more e¢ cient monitoring techonology k b k a or a lower value of liquidation, maxf1; b g a .
Finally, notice that there is an interesting tradeo¤ when we consider the e¢ cient number of bankers, in general. Fewer bankers reduces total monitoring, other things being equal, but entails more deposits per banker, and hence we must use a higher probability of monitoring each one to get them to behave well. Therefore, there is in general an optimal number of bankers, which depends on the monitoring cost function.
In fact, even if there is only one sector -i.e. one set of ex ante homogeneous agentsif we were willing to consider asymmetric allocations, it would be desirable in general to designate some subset of them to be bankers, and concentrate monitoring e¤orts on them. The trade o¤ would again be that fewer bankers reduces costs for a given level of monitoring, but entails larger deposits per bank which increases incentives to renege. For illustration, let us consider our last example economy with a monitoring cost function k 0 + k, where k 0 > 0. This cost function implies increasing return to scale. Suppose there are n agents of type 1 b , so n potential bankers. Given a feasible allocation x b 2 and deposits d, the monitoring probability if there is a single banker is given by the binding repayment constraint, so that
Notice that the lone banker now has to store his own production x b 2 , the deposit he stores d as well as the production of all other agents 1 b he stores (n 1) x b 2 . The total monitoring cost is then k 0 + 1 k. Now suppose we increase the number of bankers to m n. Then the monitoring probability is
It is 1 =m, as the total storage can now be split in m equal parts. The total monitoring cost however becomes m (k 0 + 2 k) = mk 0 + 1 k. This is clearly higher than the monitoring cost with one banker. Notice that we have assumed that the allocation x b 2 was feasible with a single banker in sector b. This may not be always true, in which case there is a minimum number of bankers necessary to sustain x b 2 . A moment re ‡ec-tion will convince the reader that the minimum number of bankers m , guaranteeing that x b 2 is feasible given d, must satisfy m = 1. Clearly, this is also the optimal number of bankers in our example and it is given by
Everything being equal, there are fewer bankers the less they have to store, the more they have at stake, or the lower their ability to default.
Rate of return dominance
In this section, we show that e¢ cient bankers need not have the best storage technology, if they are relatively better at commitment. This implies a simple rate of return dominance result. Consider again the case where U 1 (x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 2 and U 2 (x 2 ; x 1 ) = u (x 2 ). Also, let a = b and a = b = 1, and assume that the planner puts equal weights on types 1 and 2, ! 1 = ! 2 = !. Each unit stored in sector i returns 1 + i , where for the sake of illustration we assume
We show that, for some parameters, deposits in sector b are Pareto essential, despite of a better storage technology in sector a. Intuitively, this explains why individuals deposit wealth in their checking accounts, despite the existence of alternative investments with higher returns: the agents holding these deposits can be counted on to make good on their obligations, making their liabilities good payment instruments.
We know from the earlier analysis that for this speci…cation the dynamic incentive constraints for type 2 do not bind. Hence, absent any interaction between the two sectors, and given ! 1 = ! 2 , the planner solves
Ignoring (38) and (39) severe that it is worthwhile for agents in sector a to give up something on the rate of return and deposit resources in sector b.
The second case (b) is similar, except that agents in sector b have a binding repayment constraint when b < b . Therefore, they need to be compensated for taking deposits, to prevent default. A transfer from sector a does just that, but it comes on top of the additional production required from agents in sector a to cover for the loss in return. Hence, in this case, deposits in sector b are PE if a = (1 + ) + a = b < 1, which is a stricter condition than case (a). Also, as the storage technology of sector a improves, their commitment problem must be worse for deposits in sector b to be PE. In any case, the key message here is that bankers are not necessarily agents with the best investment opportunities, and for deposits to be used e¢ ciently in payments they do not necessarily have to have the greatest return.
A brief digression on history
We have established that deposits are essential: for incentive reasons, it can be bene…cial for an agent who wants something from a second agent to deposit goods with a third party -an intermediary -who holds them until withdrawn by the second party.
The reason is that the third party may be more credible in terms of commitments to honor its obligations, either because he is more likely to be monitored, or has more at stake if he gets caught. This can be an e¢ cient arrangement even if the thirds party does not have access to the best storage technology or, more generally, the highest return investment opportunities. As we said, we think this resembles banking. In this section we go into a little more detail on banking history. We begin by discussing the fact that our theory of banking involves no outside money, although the deposit receipts discussed above constitute inside money. We then go on to discuss certain other features of banking history in the context of out model.
First, banks were historically institutions that accepted deposits for a variety of reasons, including safe keeping and access to investment opportunities. We already mentioned the English goldsmith bankers. 27 Ging back in history, Mueller (1997) descibes in considerably detail the medieval Venetian bankers. He distinguishes between regular deposits, which were speci…c goods that bankers had to deliver on demand, and irregular deposits, involving specie or coins that only had to be repaid with the same value (and not the same specie or coins). The depositor making an irregular deposit tacitly agreed to the investment by the banker of the deposits. One point we want to emphaisze is that deposits of real goods existed long before the invention of coinage (outside money) in Lydia in the 7th century.
In ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, e.g., mainly for security and to economize on transportation costs, goods were often deposited in palaces and temples. As Davies (2002) puts it:
Grain was the main form of deposits at …rst, but in the process of time other deposits were commonly taken: other crops, fruit, cattle and agricultural implements, leading eventually and more importantly to deposits of the precious metals. Receipts testifying to these deposits gradually led to transfers to the order not only of depositors but also to a third party. In the course of time private houses also began to carry on such deposit business, and probably grew to be of greater importance internally than was the case in contemporary Egypt. The banking operations of the temple and palace based banks preceded coinage by well over a thousand years, and so did private banking houses by some hundreds of years. 27 The story of the goldsmiths is well known, and described in standard reference books as follows: "the direct ancestors of modern banks were, however, neither the merchants nor the scrivenors but the goldsmiths. At …rst the goldsmiths accepted deposits merely for safe keeping; but early in the 17th century their deposit receipts were circulating in place of money and so became the …rst English bank notes" (Encyclopedia Britannica 1954, vol. 3, p. 41) . "The cheque came in at an early date, the …rst known to the Institute of Bankers being drawn in 1670, or so" (Encyclopedia Britannica 1941, vol. 3, p. 68) . For more specialized references, see Joslin (1954) and Quinn (1997) . Although many people call the goldsmiths the …rst modern bankers, some others give this credit to the Templars; see Weatherford (1997) A very early development in the evolution of banking is that deposits were used to facilitate exchange. As in the model, throughout history a second party is more likely to give you something today if you can use the liability of a credible third party. As we said above, notes, checks, debit cards and related instruments issued by commercial banks have this feature. Returning to Venice, Mueller (1997) explains how deposits "served a function comparable to that of checking accounts today, that is, it was not intended primarily for safekeeping or for earning interest but rather as a means of payment which facilitated the clearance of debts incurred in the process of doing business. In short, the current account constituted 'bank money', money based on the banker's promise to pay."
28
In any case, this system obviously can only work if bankers are relatively credible, or trustworthy. Our theory says that the more visible is an agent or the more he has at stake, the more credible he becomes. The Rialto banks in medieval Venice o¤er evidence consistent with this idea.
Little capital was needed to institute a bank, perhaps only enough to convince the guarantors to pledge their limited backing and clients to deposit their money, for it was deposits rather than funds invested by partners which provided bankers with investable capital. In the …nal analysis, it was the visible pratimony of the banker -alone or as part of a fraternal compagnia -and his reputation as an operator on the market place in general which were placed on the balance to o¤set risk and win trust. 28 According to many, those deposits did not actually circulate, and transferring funds from one account to another "generally required the presence at the bank of both payer and payee" (Kohn 1999) . This is the argument for calling the goldsmiths, whose liabilities did circulate, the …rst modern banks (see also Quinn 2002) . But even if they did not circulate in this sense, the deposits of the earlier bankers cleary still facilitated payments. (Mueller 1997, p. 97) Our model also uses on random monitoring, and makes the assumption that when a banker is caught cheating, he is expelled from the market. The direct evidence for this is scant, but the history of the Venetian bankers makes us think that these features are not far o¤. "In order to maintain 'public faith,' the Senate in 1467 reminded bankers of their obligation to show their account books to depositors upon request, for the sake of comparing records ... Penalty for noncompliance was set at 1,000 ducats." (Mueller 1997, p. 45) . Thus, while it may have been prohibitively costly for depositors to continuously check the books, one can imagine that monitoring was performed every so often. And if caught cheating, the punishment was indeed lifetime banishment from any banking activity in Venice. Apparently this happened very rarely -consistent with theory.
We also mention that many bankers historically started as merchants, who almost by de…nition have a greater connection to the market than a typical individual. As Kohn (1999) describes it, e.g., the great banking families in Renaissance Italy and Southern Germany in the sixteenth century were originally merchants, who began lending their own capital, and then started collecting deposits from other merchants, nobles, clerics, and small investors. They were not the wealthiest group; wealth then was concentrated in the hands of landowners, who controlled agriculture, forests, and mineral rights. But the merchants arguably had the most to loose from reneging on obligations. Thus, "because commerce involved the constant giving and receiving of credit, much of a merchant's e¤ort was devoted to ensuring that he could ful…ll his own obligations and that others would ful…ll theirs" (Kohn 1999 ).
Finally, returning again to Venice:
In the period from about 1330 to 1370, eight to ten bankers operated on the Rialto at a given time. They seem to have been relatively small operators on the average... Around 1370, however the situation changed [and] Venetian noble families began to dominate the marketplace. After the banking crisis of the 1370s and the War of Chioggia, the number of banchi di scritta operating at any given time on the Rialto dropped to about four, sometimes as few as three. These banks tended, therefore to be larger and more important than before. Their organizational form was generally either that of the fraterna or that of the partnership, the latter often concluded between a citizen and a noble. (Mueller 1997, p. 82) As in our model, there seem to have been interesting issues concerning the e¢ cient number of bankers, revolving around greater credibility or commitment and larger amounts of deposits per bank. To sum up, although we can only touch on economic history here, we think the key features of our theory are not inconsistent with the record.
Conclusion
This paper studied banking using a mechanism design approach. We began by describing an economic environment, with preferences, technologies, and certain frictions including temporal separation, imperfect monitoring, commitment issues, and costly record keeping. We described the set of incentive feasible allocations and optimal allocations. We did not start with assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. Rather, we looked at the set of incentive feasible or e¢ cient allocations and tried to interpret the outcomes in terms of arrangement that resemble banking. In the model, it is e¢ cient for certain agents, chosen endogenously based on their attachment to the market and our ability to monitor them, to accept deposits, and these deposits help faciliate exchange. This activity can be part of an e¢ cient arrangement even if these agents do not have the best storage technologies or investment opportunities, if they have an advantage in commitment, making them more trustworthy; of course, other things equal, it is better if bankers have good investment opportunities.
The arrangement generated by the model clearly resemble salient aspects of banking in both modern and historical contexts. We proved that this activity is essential:
if we were to rule it out, the set of feasible allocations would be inferior. This was not a forgone conclusion -frictionless models do not have an essential role for banks. We also discussed issues related to who would make a good banker, how many bankers we should have, and who should be monitored when monitoring is costly. We think our approach is novel and complementary with other theories of banking. We also think it is consistent with economic history. Even if some of these results are not too surprising, one can use the theory to identify relatively precisely the relevant e¤ects 
Proof of Proposition 3
Since b > a , it must be that S x 
To show deposits are PE in sector b, we show that increasing d relaxes the repayment constraint in sector a. The left side of (47) Since u 0 (x a ) > 1=(1 + ), this condition is always satis…ed.
